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Abstract
This paper explores the linkages between dowry payments and educational attainment
of women. It formulates an unitary household model that captures how these linkages can
potentially impact the educational investment decisions within a household. Based on ex-
isting literature and the theoretical model, the following three competing hypotheses arise,
namely, (i) dowry do not affect educational attainment (ii) dowry favors educational attain-
ment of women (iii) dowry hampers educational attainment of women. Using a national
level household survey from India, we test between these three hypotheses. It adopts an in-
strumental variable estimation strategy to correct for endogeneity of the dowry measure. It
finds strong empirical evidence for the hypothesis that expected dowry payments adversely
affects female educational attainment. This is mainly driven by the hypergamous marriage
custom, by which a bride is normally matched with a groom of higher educational level,
which leads to the perverse outcome of dowry increasing with educational level of both
bride and groom. We find that future dowry payments have a significant role in lowering
educational attainment among women in India. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at
empirically estimating the impact of dowry system on the educational attainment of women.
An Engel curve estimation using household expenses reveals significant ender bias in terms
of educational expenses. The extension of the research also shows dowry contributes to the
‘missing women’ phenomenon, due to the positive influence of dowry on parents’ preference
for male children.
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1 Introduction
Social gains from female education are multifaceted, this includes improvement of health out-
comes of children, lowering of fertility rates, infant and child mortality rates (Subbarao and
Raney, 1995; Paul Schultz, 2002). However, educational investment in the girl child is found
to be lower than that of her male counterpart, especially in developing countries. Behrman and
Knowles (1999) find that schooling of girls is considered more of a luxury in Vietnam, while
Parish and Willis (1993) discover elder female siblings sacrificing lot more for the education of
their male younger siblings. Significant within household gender discrimination of educational
expenditure is found in Pakistan (Aslam and Kingdon, 2008). Azam and Kingdon (2013) finds
a pro-male bias in education enrollment in India as well as discrimination within household ex-
penditure. Lancaster et al. (2006) finds significant gender bias in educational attainment using
a sample from three Indian states.
In India, according to the latest available survey on higher education, the enrolment rate
of men in higher education stood at 21.6 % while that of women stood at 18.9 % 1. This
gender disparity is prevalent in school enrolment as well. For example, according to latest
school enrolment data provided by the government there is a difference of about 4.6 , 8.2
and 6.1 percentage points between enrolment rates of boys and girls at upper-primary, lower
secondary and senior secondary levels respectively. 2
The extant literature posits several reasons for the gender differential or bias 3 in educational
attainment. Specific cultural practices and customs play an important role in deciding the extent
of this gender discrimination. One such custom widely practiced in South Asia is the Dowry- the
payment made by the bride’s family to the groom (or his family) at the time of the wedding. In
this paper, we explore in detail the impact of dowry payments on the educational attainment of
women in India. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at empirically capturing the impact
of dowry system on educational attainment of women.
The existing theoretical models and empirical literature on dowry is not conclusive on its
impact on educational attainment in girl children. This is because there are varying motives
for payment of dowry, ranging from dowry seen merely as a bequest for women (Botticini and
1 Source: All India Survey On Higher Education 2011-12
2 https://data.gov.in/catalog/gross-enrolment-ratio-ger-0
3 The term gender discrimination or gender bias used in this paper is by default assumed to be favoring the male
gender unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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Siow, 2003) to a hedonic price for a good match of characteristics of bride and the groom (Rao,
1993b,a). As a result, some literature predict that dowry will have no impact on educational
investment, while some other literature predict a positive impact and a negative impact on
educational investments in women. We set up these different possibilities as testable hypotheses
in the empirical section. We find strong empirical evidence that dowry payments reduce the
educational attainment of women in India.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The paper begins by discussing the existing literature
on the causes of gender differences in human capital. The paper then provides an overview of
the marriage practices in India and the role of dowry payments. It discusses the three potential
relationships between the level of education of the bride and dowry payments. The paper then
presents a theoretical model that captures the link between future dowry payments and its
potential impact on educational investment in female children. The empirical section of the
paper tests the theoretical predictions using an instrumental variable estimation strategy. We
find that dowry emerges as a significant contributing factor to the reduction in educational
attainment of women. The paper provides some further empirical analyzes that confirm the
existence of gender bias in educational investment, using the Engel Curve approach proposed
by Deaton (1997). It also shows that dowry payments contribute to the ‘son preference’ among
parents and may have contributed significantly to the ‘missing women’ phenomenon highlighted
by Sen (1990).
2 Gender Differences in Human Capital Investments
The long discourse to explain gender differentials in human capital can be classified into three
broad categories that are discussed below, focusing on economic returns, parental preferences
and cultural factors respectively.
The first strand of literature gives focus on economic returns to human capital. Becker
(1981) argues eloquently that both the quantity and the quality of children and associated sex-
imbalances respond to income and economic returns. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) posits
that a higher share of family resources is devoted to the gender that has more earnings potential
in future. They find that the gender differential in employment rates can significantly explain
the differences in gender specific survival rates in India. This basic intra-household investment
model framework when combined the widespread gender differential in earning opportunities
can explain a large share of lower educational investment in female children (Aisenbrey and
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Brackner, 2008; Kingdon and Unni, 2001). Foster and Rosenzweig (1999) explores the impact
of returns to human capital on the survival rates of women. By analyzing a panel data set from
India, they find evidence to support that sex-differentials in mortality are sensitive to returns to
human capital. In the absence of social safety nets and old age pensions, in most developing
economies, parents tend to depend on their son’s income in their old age (Wang, 2005). This
gives additional economic reasons for investing more in human capital of the boy child, who is
responsible for parents’ wellbeing in future. Along similar lines, Qian (2008) uses exogenous
increases in sex-specific agricultural income in China and finds that increasing female income,
holding male income constant, improves survival rates for girls, and increases educational at-
tainment of all children.
The second strand of literature highlights the role of parental preferences and altruism.
Thomas (1990) proposes that the gender preferences of the father and mother play an impor-
tant role on the human capital investment of children. Using empirical data from Brazilian
households, he finds evidence that Fathers’ prefer sons and Mothers prefer daughters. Hence,
the increased income of mother was found to disproportionately favor female health outcomes.
Sahn and Stifel (2002) finds similar results using data from 14 African countries, the greater
education of mother results in higher human capital investment in the girl child. This line of
argument could be extended to educational investment and related gender bias. For instance,
King and Bellew (1989) finds that the father’s education level had twice the impact on son’s ed-
ucation than on daughter’s education in Peru, while King and Lillard (1987) finds that mother’s
education had a significantly positive effect only on daughter’s education in Malaysia. Hence
the ‘son preference’ of the wage earning father could further exacerbate the gender bias in ed-
ucational investments. In addition to the income share of each parent, the mother’s ‘bargaining
position’ in household plays an important role in limiting the extent of gender bias. Quisumb-
ing and Maluccio (2003) finds evidence to reject the unitary household model and finds that
improved women’s bargaining position increases expenditure share on education in the house-
holds in South Africa and Bangladesh. On the other hand, Behrman et al. (1982) proposes a
model where there is parental preference for equality among siblings, so the parents compen-
sate the child with lesser future earnings potential 4. Barcellos et al. (2012) cites son-preference
of parents as the potential reason for significantly higher childcare time allotted to boys when
4 It is difficult to explain pro-male gender bias in educational investment using this model, unless we assume a
lower relative earnings potential of male child
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compared to girls.
The third category of literature emphasizes the role of cultural practices and societal norms.
Sen (1990) argues that economic causes for women’s deprivation have to be integrated with
other social and cultural factors to give depth to the explanation. Marriage customs like the
dowry (payments made by the bride’s parents to the groom’s family), the bride price (the op-
posite of dowry practiced in parts of Africa) or the practice of brides moving in with in-laws
post-marriage (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Rahman and Rao, 2004) or cultural norms related to
women’s employment (Fernï£¡ndez, 2007) all can contribute to varying degrees to gender differ-
ences in human capital investments. For example, Dyson and Moore (1983) posited that cultural
bias favoring exogamous marriage in North India and South India’s bias favoring endogamous
marriage between close kin contributes to the differences in women’s autonomy between the
two regions. Rahman and Rao (2004) tested these postulations using household level data from
north and south India and found that even though "culture" matters to women’s autonomy, it
may not be in the ways or to the extent that Dyson and Moore (1983) predicted. Rahman and
Rao (2004) highlighted the importance of women’s economic opportunities and investing in vil-
lage infrastructure could go far toward increasing women’s agency in rural India. Vella (1994)
uses a dataset from Australia and finds that attitudes towards traditional gender roles will have
substantial impact on educational investments in women.
This paper will look into greater detail the linkages between the role of dowry payments and
female educational attainment.
3 Dowry System and the Educational Attainment of Women
In this paper we will explore in detail the role of dowry in determining gender bias in educational
investment, specifically in the Indian context. As will be described in the subsequent sections,
the existing literature has divergent views on the impact of dowry on educational investment in
women. In order to gauge the impact of dowry on educational attainment in women, the starting
point will be an analysis of how dowry responds to educational qualification of a potential
bride, subsequently, the paper will analyze how this relation will in turn affect the educational
investment in female children. The next section will give a broad overview of marriage practices
in India and the perceived role of dowry payments.
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3.1 Marriage Practices in India and the Dowry system
In India, marriages are near universal because of the societal norms that makes it mandatory for
anyone reaching adulthood. One distinguishing feature of Indian marriages is that it considered
an alliance of two families and the families play a big role in the marriages. A bride’s family
normally initiates the search for a suitable groom and the marriage alliance is arranged with the
groom’s parents or other elders in the groom’s family. The alliance is determined by an inter-
play of religion, caste, class, socio-economic status of families and individual traits of both the
groom and the bride.
Another feature of Indian marriage customs is that of ‘hypergamy’ 5 or the practice of women
marrying ‘upwards’ is prevalent or is the norm in the Indian society.6 In fact, ‘hypergamy’ is the
socially accepted and more common mixed-class unions in all monogamous societies (Edlund,
1999). The hierarchy in society is being defined by a variety of socially desirable characteristics
such as wealth, social status, physical appearance such as height, the professional qualifications
of the groom (Basu, 1999). Hence, its customary for a girl with a certain level of education to be
matched with a boy of a higher educational level. This practice of assortative matching in terms
of personal characteristics (schooling) as well as characteristics of the family have been found to
exist in other parts of the world (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003; Fafchamps and Quisumbing,
2005).
Exchange of gifts or marriage transactions are not specific to India and it is practiced else-
where in the world. According to the holy text ‘the Laws of Manu’ of the predominant Hindu
religion, one of the ten paths to reach moksha or enlightenment is kanyadana, the act of giving
a virgin bride to the groom along with financial and/or other gifts that is known as dakhshina
or dowry (Chowdhury, 2010). In olden days dowry was practiced widely in the North of India,
while in the South the opposite custom of brideprice was more common. The almost complete
transition from ‘bride-price’ to ‘dowry’ in India has been recorded as early as 1980’s (Rajaraman,
1983; Caldwell et al., 1983). What used to be an upper caste tradition has become prevalent in
all Indian classes now (Srinivasan, 2005). Different theories have been proposed to explain the
reason for the survival of this age- old tradition. We explore some of the main cited reasons for
dowry payments in the Indian context.
5 Barbara (1981) argues the strong pressure of hypergamy played a key role in the increased female infanticide in
India
6 For example, in the Rural Economic and Demographic Surveys (REDS) 2006 panel dataset from India, the
education level of the bridegroom is found to be 1.5 times the number of schooling years of the bride on average.
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Dowry is sometimes viewed partly as a pre-mortem inheritance for daughters. For example,
Botticini and Siow (2003) theorize dowry as a way to distribute family wealth among children
and postulates that in India the dowry system will eventually disappear with the unfolding
of modernization and urbanization, similar to experiences in Greece and Brazil. They argue
that it is better for parents to give inheritance to daughters in the form of dowry because this
will increase the incentives for sons to work hard with their family assets as they are the sole
claimants of the remaining family wealth. However, as noted by Chowdhury (2010) if dowry
actually serves only as a bequest to the daughter, then groom’s characteristics such as age,
education or landholding should not matter in determining the dowry. However, many empirical
work on the dowry payments finds strong evidence for the fact that dowry is strongly correlated
by groom’s desirable characteristics (Dalmia, 2001; Chowdhury, 2010; Srinivasan, 2005; Bloch
and Rao, 2002; Rao, 1993a; Dalmia and Lawrence, 2005). Dalmia and Lawrence (2005) further
gives two other reasons against dowry being just pre-mortem inheritance, one, in many cases
bride’s parents spend beyond their capacity (more than any possible inheritance, see also Rao
(1993b)) to meet dowry demands and secondly, dowry continues to exist in states such as
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in spite of their gender-neutral inheritance laws. This suggests
that payment of dowry might have other motives beyond just that of pre-mortem inheritance.
Another school of thought theorize Dowry as proxying the extend of economic contribution
of women and women’s contribution to home productivity. Dowry was predominant in North
India, where plough-based wheat cultivation was involved which gave women less opportunities
for farm-labour. On the contrary in the South India, where bride price was practiced, the staple
crop is rice whose cultivation involved a high degree of female participation. Thus the differ-
ences in economic contribution of women was cited as a reason for the differences in marriage
payments (Goody, 1973; Miller, 1980). This line of thinking was later extended to more recent
contexts in Foster and Rosenzweig (1999); Behrman et al. (1999) and Lahiri and Self (2007).
The marriage market responds to economic contribution made by women such as wages earned
through labour force participation or through home-schooling of children, whereby be increas-
ing their returns to education. So according to these theories it is women who cannot make such
contributions to home productivity or labor force participation that are expected to pay higher
dowries as sort of compensation.
Yet another way of conceptualizing dowries, and in fact the one that is more popular among
Economists, is that of seeing dowry as the hedonic price that equalizes the ‘differentials’ or the
price for a good match of characteristics between groom’s and bride’s and their families. This
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line of theory was introduced by Rao (1993b), who adapted Rosen’s (Rosen, 1974) implicit
market model to the Indian marriage market. In this model, a groom’s household utility is based
on a vector of its own characteristics, and the traits of the groom, represented by G, the value
of a consumption good X and the desirable traits of the bride and her family, B. The choice
variables of Groom’s household will be the private consumption good X and the desirable traits
of the bride and her family B.
U = U(G,X,B) (1)
The utility is maximized over B and X subject to the following budget constraint, where
Y G is the groom’s household wealth. The dowry function is modelled in a way to map the
differences in traits between the grooms and bride (B −G). R is a vector of exogenous shifters
of Dowry, such that
Y G +D(B −G,R) = pX (2)
Similarly for the bride’s household the utility V is composed of household consumption C, traits
of groom G and bride’s and their household traits B
V = V (B,C,G) (3)
, which is maximized over G and C subject to the following budget constraint, where Y B is
the household wealth of household
Y B −D(B −G,R) = pC (4)
For a set of bride and groom households equilibrium occurs when the ratio of marginal utili-
ties of traits to consumption is equalized for both households (the offer curves) and is tangential
to the Dowry curve. This condition is given by the following,
UBi
UX
= DBi =
VGi
VC
= DGi (5)
The dowry function, D(B − G,R) can be understood as the locus of tangencies of pairs of
offer curves of groom’s and bride’s households. A variety of exogenous shifters of dowry R has
also been proposed in the literature. One such factor is the demographic shifts. For instance, Rao
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(1993b) integrates the ‘marriage squeeze’ phenomenon (as noted by Caldwell et al. (1983) in In-
dia) associated with population growth and increased supply of women of marriageable age and
the resulting increased competition for scarce grooms to induce an upward shift in the dowry
function. Another factor that shifts the dowry function is the caste dynamics. For instance,
Anderson (2003) argues the reason why dowry practice thrive in south Asia, unlike places like
Europe, is due to the caste based stratification in the society and its interplay with moderniza-
tion which results in higher wealth dispersion. In this conception of dowry, dowry could be
seen as a price paid for desirable characteristics of the groom and his household. Fafchamps
and Quisumbing (2005) studies the assortative matching of brides and grooms in Ethiopia and
associated asset transfers, they find evidence for the fact that some parents give more assets to
daughters whenever doing so increases the chances of marrying wealthier grooms.
Dowry has also been seen as a payment for ensuring higher bargaining power for the bride
in husband’s family and household. Bloch and Rao (2002) finds that the domestic violence
experienced by brides increases with noncompliance with dowry demands.
In addition to the debate on the reasons for dowry payment, there has been a series of em-
pirical work aiming to determine whether there has been a real dowry inflation (Rao, 1993b,a;
Edlund, 2000; Rao, 2000; Dalmia, 2004; Arunachalam and Logan, 2008). However, we do not
enter this strand of debate in our paper. But one thing is clear; the dowry custom continues to
exist at large in the Indian society.
3.2 Dowry and the Educational Level of Bride
Due to the different conceptions of Dowry, as discussed in the previous section, there is an
inconclusive debate in the existing literature on the relationship between dowry paid by the
bride’s family (Dd = D(G,B,R)) and education level (ed) of the bride. We state this as three
hypotheses below.
Hypothesis 1: Dowry payments do not depend on the educational level of the bride.
This would be the case if dowry is seen as a pre-mortem inheritance to the girl child as
theorized by Botticini and Siow (2003). If this is the case, dowry should not depend on the
education level of the bride or the groom.
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Hypothesis 2 : Dowry reduces with education level of the bride. Hence, brides with higher levels
of education pay less dowries.
In the theoretical model used in Lahiri and Self (2007) this is the case of ‘bride-specific’
dowry. In this case, bride specific characteristics such as education is seen as an asset that she
brings to groom’s family and as a result dowry is assumed to fall with increase in educational
level of brides. Similarly, in the theoretical model proposed by Foster and Rosenzweig (1999),
to explain the economic growth propelled by technical change in altering gender-specific human
capital investments, one of the crucial assumptions made is that ‘marriage market rewards the
human capital of the women by either decreasing the dowry paid to grooms or increasing the
bride price for brides with higher levels of human capital’ ((Foster and Rosenzweig, 1999) page
9, foot note 10).
Hypothesis 3: Dowry increases with education level of the bride. Hence, brides with higher
levels of education pay more dowry.
This is essentially the case of groom-specific dowry in the theoretical model used by Lahiri
and Self (2007). This line of argument hinges on the fact that in India, hyper-gamous marriage
practices are more prevalent. So brides tend to get matched with grooms with education levels
higher than of themselves. So as Jejeebhoy and Halli (2006) describes, the more educated a girl
becomes, the more limited her marriage options become; she will need a higher dowry to marry
someone with equal or higher levels of education, since more educated grooms can ask for a
higher dowry from the bride’s family. Dasgupta and Mukherjee (2008) argues that educated
brides increases the probability of couple’s living separately from groom’s household, therefore
educated brides might have to pay higher dowries as a sort of compensation to groom’s parents
to this decrease in probability of co-residence. Dalmia (2001) find emprical evidence for the fact
that education of women seems to negatively impact their likelihood of marriage. The section
8.1 of appendix gives a simple theoretical model using search and matching framework to show
that this equilibrium with higher educated brides paying higher dowries is feasible under the
practice of hypergamous marriage practices.
Based on the existing empirical literature on dowry payments in India, it is unclear which
of the above three hypothesis holds true in reality. Though in most empirical studies, dowry
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payments are seen to be positively and significantly related to education level of bride and the
grooms, whereby supporting hypothesis 3. This is the case is Rao (1993b,a); Srinivasan (2005);
Bloch and Rao (2002); Dalmia (2004); Dalmia and Lawrence (2005); Chowdhury (2010)7.
However, problem with all these studies is that the education level of the bride could be en-
dogenous and could be proxying the impact of the household wealth on the dowry payments
(Edlund, 2000). Through our empirical analyzes of measuring the impact of expected dowry
payments on educational investments in female children, we are able to get around this endo-
geneity problem.
3.3 Dowry and Educational Investments in Women
The relationship between dowry and education level of the bride can have potential implica-
tions for the decisions on educational investment in children. This section describes a unitary
household model of intrahousehold utility maximization in order to explore such implications.
3.3.1 A Unitary Household Model of Human Capital Investment
This section will analyze the impact of dowry on premarital parental investment through a
unitary household model with intra-household human capital investment model (Becker and
Tomes, 1976; Thomas, 1990; Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Alderman and King, 1998). We con-
sider a nuclear family with two children- one boy and one girl. The parents survive for two
periods. In the first period, parents make human capital investments in the children and also
marry the children resulting in dowry payments. The parents maximize the utility function Ued,es
Max Ued,es = U(C1, C2) (6)
C1 = Y −Dd(ed, R) + sDs(es, R)− ped − pes (7)
7 Dalmia (2001) analyzes household survey data from 70 Indian villages, conclude that dowry is payment for
establishment of a desirable marital alliance, one in which the groom’s status, age, height, education, hence,
income earning potential is higher than that of the bride. Along similar lines, Chowdhury (2010) uses the
Rural Economic and Demographic Surveys of 1971 and 1999 and notes that dowry prevalence increased in
India over these years and underscores positive association between bride’s education and dowry. As part of
the ‘Youth in India: Situation and Needs Study’ organized by the Population Council, a survey was conducted in
2006-07 among 50,000 youth in India and found that increasing educational level is positively associated with
dowry practices.This further revealed that dowry is very much part of the accepted marriage customs of even the
educated youth in the country.
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C2 = τ(es, ed) (8)
C1, C2 are the consumption levels of the parental household in the first and second periods
respectively where the price of consumption is normalized to 1. Y is the total income of the
parents household, p is the uniform cost of education for son and daughter8 , Dd is the dowry
payment made for the daughter which is a function of the educational level of daughter, ed, as
discussed in the previous section. Similarly, es represents the educational level of the son, Ds
the dowry payment he brings, of which parents receive a share, s. For simplicity, we assume
the second period consumption of the parents, C2 is funded entirely by transfers from son and
daughter, which increases with their education levels.
Parents maximize their lifetime utility levels by determining the optimal level of educational
levels of their children. We obtain the following first order conditions:
∂U
∂C1
(p+
∂Dd(ed, R)
∂ed
) =
∂U
∂C2
∂τ
∂ed
(9)
∂U
∂C1
(p− s∂Ds(es, R)
∂es
) =
∂U
∂C2
∂τ
∂es
(10)
The implication of the above F.O.C’s (Equations 2.9 & 2.10) is that parents invest in their
children’s education to the point where the marginal cost in terms of consumption today equals
the marginal benefit of increased consumption tomorrow. The impact of dowry on the deci-
sions of educational investments in children depends on the signs of ∂Dd∂ed and
∂Ds
∂es
. Let us now
proceed to analyze the implications of hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 on this intrahousehold decision
making model. For ease of exposition, let us assume that the marginal benefit on right hand
side is similar for both daughter and son. Without loss of generality let us assume the following
functional form for Dowry:
Di = e
α
i R
γ ; (11)
where, i ε {s, d} , therefore,
8 We assume a uniform cost of education for both the son and daughter. This in fact is a simplification. For the
same unit of education, if anything, the daughter’s education can cost more as more resources need to be spent
to ensure her safety and security, especially in rural areas. Hence if we add this additional cost into the model, it
will only exacerbate the marginal cost of female education.
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∂Di(ei, R)
∂ei
= αeα−1i R
γ (12)
The value of α is determined by hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 discussed in the earlier section, will
determine the impact of education on dowry.
Scenario 1 : α = 0
This would be the case, if hypothesis 1 holds i.e., dowry payment do not depend on educa-
tional level of the bride. As a result, it can be seen that how dowry changes with educational
level of the bride will not make any difference to the marginal cost of educational investments.
Hence, dowry payments will not affect decisions on educational investments in children in this
scenario.
Scenario 2 : α < 0
This would be the case if hypothesis 2 holds i.e., dowry reduces with educational attainment
of brides. 9 In this case, it is clear this potential impact of dowry reduces the marginal cost of
educational investment in female children (the left hand side of the FOCs given above) , while it
increases the marginal cost of educational investment in male children. Hence, dowry increases
the overall educational investment in female children. The dowry payment gives parents an
additional reason to invest in education of their daughters because they know that the dowry
demand will be lower for educated brides. In a way, parents will be able to reclaim some of the
educational investment expenses through this potential reduction in dowry payments. Under
this scenario, dowry payments help in reducing gender bias in educational attainment.
Scenario 3 : α > 0
This would be the case if hypothesis 3 holds i.e., dowry increases with educational attain-
ment of brides. 10 We can see that the marginal cost of educational investment in girl child is
higher due to the dowry payments, while the dowry payments will have the opposite effect on
9 By virtue of the hypergamous marriage practice discussed earlier, this would imply dowry received by men
reduces with their educational attainment.
10 By virtue of the hypergamous marriage practice discussed earlier, this would imply dowry received by men
increases with their educational attainment.
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the marginal cost of educational investment of the son (the left hand side of the FOCs given
above). This can result in lower educational investment in the daughter compared to that of
son as parents realise that if they educate daughters they will have to pay higher dowry to find
a suitable groom, as daughters need to be eventually matched with a groom with higher ed-
ucation. Hence, in this scenario dowry payment has a clear detrimental effect on the level of
educational investment and educational attainment of daughters. This impact will be exacer-
bated if we assume that the second period remittance rate from son is higher than that from
daughter, as most likely it’s the son who is responsible to take care of the parents.
Another point to be noted in the first order conditions above is that the exogenous variables
represented by R enters the educational investment decision making of children exclusively
through their impact on dowry payments. Hence, these variables provide a valid set of instru-
mental variables, that would enable estimation of the impact of dowry variable on educational
attainment. In the FOCs (2.9) and (2.10) above if we substitute the value of the marginal effect
given by (2.12), we obtain the optimal value of ei as a function of R and p, this is essentially the
reduced form equation of the IV 2sls estimation that we will estimate in the empirical estimation
discussed in the rest of the paper. In the next section, we analyze using a national level data
set from India and explain an empirical model that would allow to test the validity of the three
scenarios discussed above.
4 Empirical Estimation
4.1 Data and Key Variables
The paper uses the data from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2004-2005, which
is a nationally representative dataset, including 41,554 households from 1503 villages and 971
urban neighborhood areas (Desai et al., 2007).11 It includes both individual and household-level
responses on various topics such as education, employment, health, fertility, gender relations
and marriage practices. Especially the dataset provides information on all school attending
children in all the households and individual level educational expenditure and details of the
school attended.
11 We thank University of Maryland and National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi [producers],
2007, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] for making the
dataset available.
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We restrict our sample to rural households with female household members between the
ages of 5-22. Children start schooling at age 5 in India. By age of 21 (or latest by 22), students
are expected to finish their undergraduate degrees. Further, the mean age at effective marriage
for females stood at 21.2 years in 2011, according to Indian Census 2011. Hence, in most cases
the decision on education beyond undergraduate degree will be influenced by the preferences of
in-laws. Since we focus here on parental investments prior to marriage, we restrict our sample
to female children of age group 5-22. 12
The main dependent variable used in our analysis to measure the educational attainment
variable is the number of years of education completed by an individual. This variable ranges
from 0 to 15, as we restrict our sample to female children of age bracket 5-22, and children
normally commence schooling at age 5 in India.
One unique feature of the IHDS dataset enables us to study the impact of future marriage
payments on the educational attainment of women. The IHDS collected data on ‘expected cash
dowry to be paid in your community for a family like yours’. This variable is the key explanatory
variable in our analysis and is referred to as ‘expected dowry’ in our empirical analysis. As
shown in summary statistics, the mean value of dowry variable equals almost 19 times the
average yearly income of the household. This shows the scale of economic burden imposed by
the dowry payment on the bride’s family. Further, in our sample marriage is cited as the second
most important factor for taking loans.
In addition to the dowry variable, we include covariates in our regression model, which are
postulated by the existing literature on educational gender bias outlined in section 2.These co-
variates varies at the individual level, household level and village level respectively. Individual
level covariate includes age of the individual and number of siblings (age-cohort and sex seg-
regated). Covariates such as the education level of the household head, the highest education
level of the adult female in the household, the caste category of household, dummy for Mus-
lim households and households falling under scheduled castes and tribes, number of household
members, household wealth (captured by land owned and roof type), household income, media
exposure of household and status of women in household, varies at the household level. Con-
trols for district or village educational infrastructure are also included. The descriptive statistics
of all variables used the empirical estimations are provided in appendix table ??.
12 The reason for restricting our sample to rural households is that instrumental variables which we use at the later
stage in this paper correspond to village level characteristics. These instrumental variables are not be appropriate
for an urban household.
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4.2 Empirical Model
Our attempt in this section is to link the three theoretical scenarios explained in section 3.3.1 to
empirics. The empirical model that we would like to estimate in the analysis is as follows:
Educational_attainmenti = α+ βDed + γiXi + γhXh + γvXv + i (13)
β captures the impact of the expected dowry payments variable (Ded) on educational attain-
ment . Xi, Xh, Xv represent covariates that affects the educational attainment but varies at the
individual level, household level and village level respectively. i denotes the error term.
Based on the discussions in the earlier section, we know that the educational attainment
of brides might have an impact on the expected dowry variable. Hence, due to this reverse
causation, the OLS estimation of β can be potentially be biased. We can model the expected
dowry payments in the following way. We can empirically estimate the dowry function D(G, B,
R) explained earlier. Xg and Xb are respectively the characteristics of the (expected) groom and
bride households and R represents the exogenous shifters of Dowry, which can be a good source
of instrumental variables and is explored in detail in later section.
Ded = α+ θEducational_attainmenti + δgXg + δbXb + δRR+ ηi (14)
θ captures the impact of educational attainment on expected dowry payments (Ded).
In this paper, we are interested in estimating β. The sign of the asymptotic bias of the OLS
estimation of β, due to reverse causality, is given by the sign of the following term (Basu, 2015).
Sign of bias of OLS estimate of β = sign(
θ
1− θβ ) (15)
From the discussions above we can infer that if θ and β take non-zero values, then they have
to be of opposite signs. 13 Hence, the sign of the asymptotic bias of OLS estimation of β will be
equal to that of the sign of θ.
13 This is because if θ > 0 , it would imply that dowry increases with education level of the bride and this
would impose a higher marginal cost of educational investment in girl children. Hence, β would be negative
as discussed in scenario 3. In case if Dowry reduces with educational level i.e., θ is < 0, then parents will
have greater incentives to invest in the education of their daughters due to potential reduction in future dowry
payments. So the impact of dowry will result in an increase of the educational attainment of women, which will
render β to be positive (i.e., scenario 2).
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4.3 Baseline OLS Results
Table 2 provides result of baseline OLS regressions, with robust standard errors clustered at the
village level. Except for the dowry variable, most other covariates seem to show the expected
direction of linkage with the educational attainment. The educational attainment of household
head and female adults increases the educational attainment of women. The educational at-
tainment of female children rises with age. The wealth of the household (measured by land
owned and roof type of the house) has a positive impact on educational attainment. One of
the perplexing results is that the belonging to the higher caste category (Brahmin) seems to
have a negative impact on educational attainment, though this impact seems to be not signif-
icant statistically. This discrepancy in the direction of impact and significance level is due to
the bias caused by reverse causality of the dowry variable and we rectify the same in the next
section. Most importantly we find that future dowry payments seem to positively impact the
educational attainment of female children in household, in our OLS regressions. However, as
discussed the theoretical section and in the empirical model, the OLS estimation of β could be
biased due to reverse causality. In the next section we will proceed to correct for this bias using
an instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy.
4.4 Correction for Endogeneity of the Dowry Variable : An IV approach
In this section we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to correct for the potential en-
dogeneity bias caused by the dowry variable. We use two instrumental variables for correcting
the endogeneity of the dowry variable. As explained earlier, the following equation helps to
empirically capture the expected dowry payments.
Ded = α+ θEducational_attainmenti + δgXg + δbXb + δRR+ ηi (16)
The exogenous dowry shifting variables R will be appropriate instrumental variables, as they
do not affect the educational attainment or educational investment decisions in girl children
except through the dowry variable. We obtain two such exogenous dowry shifters from the
village survey that accompanied the Indian human development survey.
The first instrumental variable is a measure of the supply of suitable alliances for the poten-
tial brides. In India, especially in rural areas, people marry within their own caste and religion.
Banerjee et al. (2009) finds evidence for very strong preference for within-caste marriage even
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among the emerging middle-class. We use the proportion of population belonging to the same
caste or religion within each village could provide a proxy measure for measuring the number
of potential alliances. This measure can proxy how many eligible men of the same community
resides in the neighborhood.14 In our sample, more than 90 percent of the respondents say that
marriage takes place within the same caste/religious group. Hence, if the supply of eligible men
in the locality increases the dowry prices should fall. So we expect this variable to be negatively
correlated with the dowry measure of each household. The proportion of population belonging
to the same caste or religion within each village also measures the number of alliances that each
household can potentially receive for their daughters even from outside the village. This effect
too can potentially reduce the dowry demand. This variable can also affect dowry variable in
another way. It measures the potential size of the social network of the household. These net-
works are highly valued in the developing country context, as they provide insurance at times
of negative income shocks, act as source of information and assist in job search. These network
effects of marriage were explored in detail by Dekker and Hoogeveen (2002); Rosenzweig and
Stark (1989) and Watson (1981) in developing country settings. Marriage creates links between
the networks of both the grooms and bride’s families. So if the bride’s family has a large network
the groom’s family might demand lower dowry, as the network effect will compensate for this
reduction in dowry demand. Therefore, by increasing the supply of eligible men in locality, in-
creasing the network effect of bride’s family and by increasing the potential number of alliances
the instrumental variable will have a downward impact on the expected dowry.
The second instrumental variable is the relative wealth of the own caste and religion in the
village. We measure the relative wealth position of the caste/religious group by the proportion
of village land owned by that caste or religion. The idea is that if the caste or religious group,
which the household belongs to, is relatively wealthy in the locality, there will be an increased
expectation of dowry payment from these households. Hence dowry is expected to be positively
correlated with the relative wealth of the caste or religion in the locality. We control for house-
hold level wealth variable in the education equation, so this own-caste-group wealth effect will
not have any direct impact on education attainment variable.
Table 3 provides estimates of the IV-2SLS estimation, using the above two IVs for the ex-
pected future dowry payment. The table also provides the first stage regressions associated with
14 The religion classification divides each family into nine categories, namely, Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh,
Buddhist, Jain, Tribal, Others and none. The caste categorical variable classifies caste into Brahmin, SC, ST or
Other.
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each of the instrumental variable estimation. Both IVs are statistically significant at 5 % or 1%
level in all the specifications. 15
We find that dowry variable emerges to be a strong determinant of educational attainment
in female children. Compared to the earlier OLS regressions, we see that the impact of dowry
has become more negative and become statistically significant after correcting for endogeneity,
implying the earlier simple OLS results were biased upward. The result of the IV 2sls estimation
suggest that dowry increases the marginal cost of educating the girl child and expectation of
increased dowry payment will reduce the educational investment in girl children. The estimate
of β coefficient (table 3 column IV5 ) is -.015. At the mean value of the dowry variable of
Rs. 107000, this would imply that dowry reduces education attainment by 1.6 years, which is
approximately 35% of the average educational attainment of women (which stands at 4.5 years)
in the sample.
All the other covariates postulated in the literature affects the educational attainment of
female children in expected direction. The income and wealth of the family increases the educa-
tional attainment, the educational level of the household head and highest educational level of
the female member of the household also have a similar impact. The positive impact of family
income (Plug and Vijverberg, 2005), parental education on children’s education have already
been extensively studied (Oreopoulos and Page, 2006; Bjorklund and Salvanes, 2011). Our re-
sults support these studies and show that family income, educational attainment of adults (both
male and female) in the household increases the educational attainment of female children.
Desai and Kulkarni (2008) highlights the educational inequalities between upper caste Hin-
dus and the scheduled caste, scheduled tribes and Muslims over the period of 1983 - 2000. In
accordance with these existing inequalities, our analysis shows that belonging to a high caste
(Brahmin) increases the educational attainment, while households of scheduled castes (lower
caste groups), scheduled tribes (tribal groups) and Muslims have lower levels of educational
attainment.
The impact of siblings on educational attainment is yet to be clearly established. In the past,
studies have mainly focused on the impact of siblings on intrahousehold allocation of resources
15 More tests on the validity of the IV are discussed in section 4.5
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(Becker, 1981; Becker and Tomes, 1976; Kessler, 1991; Butcher and Case, 1994).16 Recent stud-
ies have started to also give attention to the direct impact on siblings on educational attainment
of other siblings through sibling interactions and spill overs (Oettinger, 2000; Chen et al., 2009;
Nicoletti and Rabe, 2014; Nielsen and Joensen, 2015). These studies highlight hetoregeneity
of impacts based on birth order and gender composition of siblings. 17 In order to measure
impact of siblings, we introduce the number of siblings (age and sex segregated) as covariates
in specifications IV2-IV5. In general existence of siblings seems to have a negative impact on
female educational attainment. This could be because of the intrahousehold competition among
siblings for educational investments.
We introduced controls for district educational infrastructure for IV3- IV5, educational in-
frastructure seems to have a positive impact on educational attainment. Women’s bargaining
position in the household measured by whether women’s name appears on ownership papers
of the house and by the extent of domestic violence, is included as controls in specifications
IV4-IV5. The media exposure of the household, in terms of adult males’ and adult females’ ex-
posure to TV, radio and newspaper, is used as controls in specification IV5. The significance of
the negative impact of dowry variable on educational attainment of women increases with the
addition of these controls.
4.5 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
Durbin Wu-Hausmann (p-value of .0000; Chi-Sq (1)=21.10) and Wu-Hausman (p = .000;
F(1,10257) = 21.07) tests rejected the exogeneity of the dowry variable. The Sargan-Hansen
test of overidentifying restrictions Instruments, with a null hypothesis that ‘the instruments are
valid’ was not rejected (p-value: 0.49). The underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM
statistic) with a null hypothesis that ‘the instruments are underidentified’ was rejected (p value
= .01). The test of weak identification (Angrist-Pischke first-stage F statistics test) rejects the
16 Butcher and Case (1994) uses data from USA between 1920 and 1965 and finds that women’s educational
choices are affected by the gender composition of siblings, while men’s choices were not affected by such factors.
Using dataset on twins, Peter et al. (2015) finds that the gender of the co-twin influences both men and women,
but in a different way. Men with brothers earn more and are more likely to get married and have children. In
case of women, there is an impact on education and age at first birth: women with sisters obtain lower education
and give birth earlier.
17 Nielsen and Joensen (2015) finds that, in terms of educational choices, peer effects among siblings are strongest
among closely spaced siblings, in particular brothers. Oettinger (2000) finds that older siblings’ achievements
have a positive impact on younger siblings’ achievement and not vice-versa. In terms of school achievement,
Nicoletti and Rabe (2014) finds evidence for modest spillover effect from the older sibling to the younger but not
vice versa. Using dataset from Taiwan Chen et al. (2009) finds that birth of a male sibling, relative to a female,
has almost no impact on women’s or men’s college enrollments on the average.
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null hypothesis of weak instruments (p value = .000).
The dependent variable ‘educational attainment’ is potentially censored from both above (at
15) and below (at 0). In order to correct for the censoring bias we ran a IV-Tobit model. All
our results remain same in the IV tobit specification, as seen in the table 4 in appendix. In
fact the magnitude of negative impact of the dowry variable strengthened further in the tobit
specification.
In our regression analysis the clustering was done simultaneously at the village and house-
hold level. This level of clustering was changed to the district level, but the significance of dowry
variable remained robust to these changes in the level of clustering. To ensure that our results
are not driven by extreme values, we removed two states with the highest mean dowry (Delhi
and Jammu and Kashmir) from our sample and re-ran our analysis. All the main results holds
despite this change, though there was a minor change in the magnitude of impact of dowry.
To minimize the impact of extreme values on key results, we took the log values of the dowry
variable and repeated the analyzes. The results are provided in table 5 in appendix. We find
that the negative impact of dowry remains significant despite the log transformation of the key
independent variable. In order to account for the zero values of educational attainment and
dowry variable, we conducted an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of these two variables
and repeated the IV 2sls estimations. All the key results remained unchanged even after this
transformation.
5 Extensions
5.1 Gender Bias in Educational Expenditures
This section will explore if the gender bias in educational investment in girl children is ob-
servable in how much the households spends on educational expenses through analyzing the
household expenses data. The Engel curve approach, proposed by Deaton (1997) is used widely
to study gender bias in educational expenditure. For instance, Aslam and Kingdon (2008) em-
ploys such an approach in the case of Pakistan , Zimmermann (2012) uses the same technique
on India, Himaz (2008) applies the approach to Sri Lanka. Education is considered an exclusive
‘child good’, so we adopt an Engel curve to estimate the gender gap in educational investment
within household. The empirical specification of the Engel curve is as follows :
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wi = α+ β ln(
xi
ni
) + µ ln(ni) +
K−1∑
k=1
γk(
nk
ni
) + τZi + θDi + ui (17)
wi : share of educational expenses out of total expenditure of the ith household, xi : total
expenditure of the ith household, ni : total number of household members of the ith household,
nk : total number of household members in the kth age-sex category, Zi : vector of house-
hold specific characteristics, Di is the expected dowry payment of the household, ui : normally
distributed error term.
The gender bias in educational investment can be estimated by comparing the γk coefficients
for each age category of male and female household members. We define the age-sex category
based on the Indian schooling system. So the K categories in our regression are male and fe-
male members of 0-5, 5-10 (lower primary school) , 10-13 (upper primary school), 13-16 (high
school), 16-18 (secondary school), 18-21 (undergraduate), 22-55 and 55 above, our reference
category is 55+ female category. This classification depending on educational system is impor-
tant, as some schools cater to only up to certain levels of education and after which the child
is required to join another school. Gender bias can play a significant role in these marginal
decisions to choose a new school , depending on its proximity to house and quality etc. Hence,
we distinguish the analysis in this part of the study from the analysis provided by Zimmermann
(2012) that uses similar data set but a different set of age-sex cohorts.
We estimate the Engel curve of household expenditure share using OLS method as well IV
2sls (in cases where we use dowry variable as a covariate) and compare the coefficient between
similar age categories and check for gender bias. The regression estimates, using six different
specifications, are given in Table 7. We include the following household specific characteristics:
the caste of the household (high caste or not), the household wealth and income measures, the
educational level of the household head, highest educational level of the female member of the
household, media exposure of family members, district educational infrastructure, controls for
status of women in the household. We also add the expected dowry payments as an additional
control. We conduct an F-test to test the equality of gender specific coefficients of all school
going age cohorts (age groups 5-21). We find statistically significant gender bias in the educa-
tional investment in the high school, secondary school and university going age cohorts in all
specifications. Interestingly, the dowry variable seems to have a positive impact on the share
of educational expenses. This could be attributed to the fact in the Engel curve estimation we
include both sons and daughters in our sample. While expected dowry payments will have a
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negative impact on daughter’s educational investments, it will have an opposite impact on ed-
ucational expenses of sons. The positive sign of the dowry coefficient could be driven by the
dominating effect of the presence of sons in our sample.
The specific impact of dowry variable on the observed gender bias in educational expenses
could be studied by further analysing the interaction effect of dowry variable on the age-sex
cohorts. The empirical model would take the following form.
wi = α+ β ln(
xi
ni
) + µ ln(ni) +
K−1∑
k=1
γk(
nk
ni
) + τZi + θDi +
K−1∑
k=1
ηk(
nk
ni
)Di + ui (18)
ηk will correspond to the impact of the dowry variable on the gender bias in educational
expenditures. However, we are unable to estimate this model using our data set due to two
reasons, namely, (i) lack of data on expected dowry received by the male child and (ii) lack of
appropriate instrumental variables for the dowry received by the male children. 18 We leave this
as a theme for future research.
Deaton (1997), after surveying several studies, concludes that the Engel curve based ex-
penditure methods often fails to show strong gender differences, even in societies where there
are clear gender bias in outcomes (like educational attainment). But we are able to observe
significant gender bias in educational expenses in crucial schooling years. So the fact that the
Engel curve based method was able to pick up the gender bias provides evidence for gender
bias in intra-household resource allocation in our sample.19 The conclusions of the earlier ana-
lyzes suggest that dowry could be a key factor that creates this gender differences in educational
investments.
18 However, we estimated the model with the interaction effect just for the female-age cohorts. The dowry variable
became insignificant and all the interaction terms were positive and insignificant; the coefficients on the female
age cohorts became negative and insignificant. The reason for this change in sign of coefficients needs further
analysis.
19 Aslam and Kingdon (2008) recommends a two-tier hurdle method to estimate the gender bias more accurately,
where in the first step household makes a decision whether to send the child to school or not and in the second
step , conditional on the decision to incur education expenditure, an appropriate investment amount is chosen.
We do not attempt to estimate a hurdle model here, since the main focus area of our paper is not to measure
the exact magnitude of gender bias. Azam and Kingdon (2013) estimates a hurdle model using a panel dataset
in India and finds that gender bias occurs primarily through differential spending on sons and daughters in the
primary and middle school age groups and through the decision to enroll sons and not daughters in the secondary
school age group.
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5.2 Dowry and ‘Missing Women’
Amartya Sen, in his seminal work, had highlighted the problem of ‘missing women’ in South
Asia, West Asia, and China (Sen, 1990).By comparing the actual proportion of women to ex-
pected proportion of women, and adding up the resultant deficit in number of women in Asia
and North Africa, Sen argued that more than 100 million women are missing in these regions.
Both excess female deaths and excess missing of female births contribute to this phenomenon
and this problem do not seem to subside with economic development. According to recent esti-
mates, since 1990, the number of missing females has risen by 43 percent (38 million) to 126
million in 2010, and is projected to further increase to 150 million in 2035 . India and China
accounted for 90 percent of the total excess prenatal deaths and 71 percent of all excess female
deaths estimated for the period 1970 - 2010 (Bongaarts and Guilmoto, 2015) . For instance, in
India, the Child Sex Ratio (CSR), defined as number of girls per 1000 of boys between 0-6 years
of age, has been showing a declining trend over the last two decades, which is quite alarming.
The CSR stood at 945 in 1991 and declined to 927 in 2001 and further to 918 in 201120.This
CSR trend points at both pre-birth and post-birth gender bias, in terms of sex-selected abortion
and discrimination against female children in terms of post-natal child care.
The conclusions from the previous section show that dowry has a negative impact on human
capital investment in girl children. This is because dowry adds to the marginal cost of child
rearing. So this leads to the question, does this detrimental impact of dowry also percolate
down to the fertility preferences and to the very survival of female children? To what extent
can dowry be a determining factor for the ‘missing women’ phenomenon ? As an extension to
our main analysis, this section will explore the role of expected dowry payments on the fertility
preferences of women.
Guilmoto (2009) posits three pre-conditions for prenatal sex selection to reach significant
levels, namely, 1) strong son preference, 2) ready access to prenatal diagnosis, and 3) low fertil-
ity. Using the data set we are able to analyze how dowry is a determining factor for son prefer-
ence. The IHDS questionnaire proposes the following question to eligible women in household
‘If you could go back to the time you did not have any children and could choose the number of
children have in your life, how many would that be?’. The gender segregated response to this
question is coded, which helps us to know if the preferred number of male children is higher
20 source http://wcd.nic.in/BBBPScheme/main.htm
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than that of female children. We create a dummy variable to code this preference for male
children. We use this dummy as the dependent variable and estimate the following empirical
model.
Preference_for_male_children = α+ βDed + γhXh + γvXv + i (19)
We postulate that the dowry variable will have a significant and positive impact on the
preference for male children. We conduct an instrumental variable- probit analysis for this
empirical model. In this estimation we use only the relative wealth position of caste/religious
group as the instrumental variable. 21 The results are presented in table 6 of appendix. We find
that expected dowry payments exert a strong positive impact on preference for male children.
This preference for male children in more prevalent in the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and
among Muslims, while the upper caste and wealthier households seem to have lesser probability
for preference of male children. This preference for male children drops significantly with the
increase in educational attainment of adults in the household.
6 Discussion and Points for Future Research
The government of India has recently launched a campaign called ‘Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao’
(Save girl child, Educate girl child) to create awareness and to promote women’s education.
During, India’s Republic day celebration this year (January 26th, 2016), a new campaign was
launched which encouraged the most-educated young woman of each village to hoist the na-
tional flag, in order to encourage and reward schooling for the girl child. Ms. Nirmala Devi,
who was selected to hoist the flag in her village of Haryana was asked about three things she
would like to change about India, interestingly, the first thing she called for is the abolishment
dowry 22. This suggestion made by the most-educated woman of this village can be regarded
as perhaps a vindication of the findings of this paper that dowry has as a detrimental impact on
female education in India.
A point to be noted is that in this paper we looked at the educational attainment variable
rather than educational expenses oh the household. This is primarily because the data on past
21 This is because the other instrumental variable measures the eligible men in the neighborhood, which could
directly impact the preference for male children
22 Read the news item on this in national media :http://www.ndtv.com/blog/my-father-took-me-by-train-to-
college-every-morning-1270192?pfrom=home-opinion
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educational expenses is limited to just one year and is unavailable for two-thirds of the sample.
Even if one argues that dowry will impact more the type of schooling (quality) rather than
the number of years of schooling (quantity) itself, this can only potentially downward bias our
estimate of dowry’s impact on educational attainment. Hence, if we incorporate this ‘quality’
aspect of education as well, the impact of dowry could be even more strongly detrimental to
educational attainment of women. For example, it needs to be studied if parents invest more
in their son’s, by giving them access to more expensive and higher quality private schools and
professional colleges. This may be further researched using appropriate dataset in the future.
The extension of the analysis of the paper reveals that dowry also has an impact on son-
preferences of households. This in turn implies that dowry also determines the fertility decisions
and the number of girl children in the family. Hence, ideally, the impact of dowry on fertility
decisions should also need to be incorporated into the estimations of impact of dowry on educa-
tional investments in children. However, it is reasonable to assume that once the fertility choice
decisions are incorporated the detrimental impact on dowry would only be aggravated. This is
because dowry is expected to have a negative impact on number of daughters as shown by the
analysis in the paper. The proof of the same has been left for further investigation.
The empirical analyzes in the paper support the argument that the expected dowry payment
negatively affects the educational attainment in female children. The expected dowry payment
adds to the marginal cost of educational investment in female children and hence provides less
incentive for the parents to invest in the girl child. This adds to the harmful consequences asso-
ciated with the dowry system, which includes high prevalence of dowry related violence. Dowry
has a pernicious impact on human capital investment in the girl child at an early stage of her
life itself. Though Dowry has been made illegal in India since 1961, it still prevails and thrives
in the society. Greater public policy intervention is called for to curb this practice and make the
society aware of its deleterious impact on the human capital investment in female children and
also in furthering gender bias in the society. However, as discussed in the paper, there could
be multiple reasons for the payment of dowry. Chowdhury (2010) particularly points out two
important reasons for a bride’s family to pay dowry, which are not mutually exclusive : firstly,
dowry could be voluntary and as a means to provide bequest to the daughter; this reason may
not lead to negative social outcomes, especially when daughter’s legal inheritance rights are
restricted. secondly, dowry paid by excessive compulsion from the groom’s family and to attract
better quality groom. For instance, (Bloch and Rao, 2002) proposes a theoretical model and em-
pirical evidence for husband’s family resorting to violence on bride to signal dissatisfaction from
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marriage (as well as low dowry payments) and to extract more dowry payments from bride’s
family in future. This form of dowry can also create detrimental societal impacts, including
the negative impacts on female human capital investments as discussed in our analysis. There
should be systematic research on how to limit this latter reason for dowry payment. By promot-
ing formal mechanisms to ensure rightful bequest to daughters complemented by more efficient
cracking down on marriage related dowry bargaining could be a step in the right direction.
The paper conducted a homogenous treatment of the entire rural sample data and did not
delve into regional variations. Specific dowry practices, the magnitude of dowry, and motives
of payment of dowry could vary across caste groups and across geographic regions in India.
Future research could explore further such geographic and caste group level heterogeneities,
using appropriate datasets.
Further, it will be interesting to study further societies where ‘bride price’ (the opposite
of dowry) prevails. A corollary of our hypothesis 3 would imply that bride price can act as an
impetus for parents to improve the human capital investment of the girl child. The better human
capital indicators (especially health indicators) of women in parts of Africa, where bride-price is
practiced, is a case in point that calls for future research.
7 Conclusion
This paper explored the links between the dowry system and the educational attainment of
women. Based on existing literature on dowry and a unitary household model of human capital
investment, three competing hypotheses arise : (i) dowry do not affect educational attainment
(ii) dowry favors educational attainment of women (iii) dowry hampers educational attainment
of women. These hypotheses were tested using an empirical model and data from a national
level household survey in India. The empirical estimation supports the hypothesis that dowry
increases the marginal cost of educational investment in girl child and reduces the incentive for
making educational investments in female children, whereby exacerbating the gender bias in
educational attainment. Using a IV-2SLS procedure, we find that the educational attainment of
women is significantly reduced by expected future dowry payments. The average value of dowry
payment in our sample results in a reduction of 1.6 years of educational attainment in women.
An Engel Curve analysis of household expenses found evidence of significant gender bias in
educational investment across majority of school going age categories. Further analysis also re-
vealed that dowry could be a significantcontributing factor to the ‘missing women’ phenomenon,
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due to its significant positive impact on son-preference of parents. The paper throws light on
several detrimental impacts of the dowry system on women and identifies several pointers for
further research in this area.
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8 Appendix
8.1 A Search and Matching Model in Marriage Market
In this section, we provide support for hypothesis 3 described in the paper, i.e., the case where
higher educated brides end up paying higher dowries. We adapt a search and match equilib-
rium framework from labour economics (Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). We
model the marriage market following a labour market as described in Albrecht and Vroman
(2002). We allow for heterogeneity in educational levels of both potential brides and grooms.
We derive the dowry payments that exists in an equilibrium, where brides with low education
are matched with grooms of both high and low education, while the high educated brides are
matched only with grooms of high education levels. This is in line with the hypergamous mar-
riage practice observed in India. We observe dispersion in dowry payments both within and
between educational categories.
The way link the labour market model with marriage market is as follows. We conceptualize
the grooms as unemployed workers seeking job. The job here is the marriage and the firms are
the families of brides. Hence, unmarried women in market are the vacancies. The job-quality
(marriage quality) is determined by the educational level of the brides, hence higher educated
bride’s translates to a high skilled job while the low-educated bride signifies the low-skilled job.
The dowry can be understood as the wages paid to workers (grooms in our case) by the firms
(bride’s family). For simplicity let us assume that dowry is paid in installments every month just
like wages and the flow of dowry stops when the marriage breaks apart.
We assume an exogenous distribution of educational levels across the brides and grooms.
Let el and eh be the educational levels corresponding to low and high education levels of the
grooms. Let the proportion of single men in the market be u and the proportion of single women
in market be v. The random meeting of single men and single women meet is determined by a
CRS function , m(u,v). Such that
m(u, v) = m(1,
v
u
) = m(θ)u, where θ =
v
u
(20)
Let γ be the proportion of single men who possess low education (el ). Let φ be the proportion
of single women who are of low- education. The effective arrival rate of marriage proposal to
single men with low education will be φm(θ). On similar lines, the single women meet single
men at the rate m(θ)θ . The higher-educated single women meets eligible single men at (1−γ)m(θ)θ .
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The set of four variables θ, φ, γ, u characterize the steady-state equilibrium satisfying the
following conditions:
1. The match formed between the bride and the groom constitutes a Nash equilibrium. 2.
The time frame associated with our model is long run with families with marriageable single
women freely entering and exiting the marriage market, hence the entry of a family with mar-
riageable single women in the market satisfies the zero-value condition. 3. The flow of single
men, with their respective education levels, into and out of the state of being single are equalized
in the steady state.
8.2 Steady state Match formation and Dowries
As postulated by the nash bargaining theory of marriages (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy
and Horney, 1981; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Kanbur and Haddad, 1994; Lundberg and Pollak,
1994), marriage is conceived as a production function and people engage in marriage due to
increase the total production levels by exploring the gains through cooperation. Hence matches
in marriage market are formed whenever the joint utility for the bride and the groom exceed
the utility associated with them being single. Let U(e) be the value of being single for a man
with education level e and let M(e,y) be the utility enjoyed by a man with education level e of
being married to a bride type y. Let V(y) be the utility to bride’s family of having an unmarried
daughter with education level y and let F(e,y) be the utility derived by the family of the bride
type y from marrying the daughter to a groom of education level e. Thus the basic condition to
be satisfied by any successful match is that:
M(e, y) + F (e, y) ≥ U(e) + V (y) (21)
A nash bargaining between the prospective grooms and the bride’s family determines the dowry
payments, D(e,y), as a result the dowry will be an exogenous share , β , of the total marriage
utility surplus.
D(e, y) =M(e, y)− U(e) = β[M(e, y) + F (e, y)− U(e)− V (y)] (22)
Let r be the discount rate, δ be the rate at which marriage breaks up and let s be the instan-
taneous value of being single for men.
We proceed to define various value functions attached to the model. The value of being in
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marriage for a groom of education level e to a bride of type y is :
M(e, y) =
D(e, y) + δU(e)
r + δ
(23)
The value to the family of the bride from having married their daughter of type y to a groom
of education level e
F (e, y) =
y −D(e, y)− c+ δV (y)
r + δ
(24)
The value of being single for low and high educated men are different, as their effective rates
of arrival of prospective alliances are different, we define these value functions below:
rU(el) = s+ φm(θ)[M(el, el)− U(el)] (25)
rU(eh) = s+m(θ){φ[M(eh, el)− U(eh)] + (1− φ)[M(eh, eh)− U(eh)]} (26)
The final value functions that need to be defined are those related to the value of an unmar-
ried girl of educational level y s.t y takes values el or eh
rV (el) = −c+ m(θ)
θ
{γ[F (el, el)− V (el)] + (1− γ)[F (eh, el)− V (el)]} (27)
rV (eh) = −c+ m(θ)
θ
{(1− γ)[F (eh, eh)− V (eh)]} (28)
The value of a low educated single women accounts for the fact that both high and low
educated men can potentially form marriage alliances with them. On the other hand, for the
high educated women only the arrival rate of higher educated men matters. The long run nature
of the model , with free entry and exit of both low and high educated single women ensures that
the zero value condition holds for these above value functions in the steady state, i.e., V (el) =
V (eh) = 0
Substituting these value functions into the necessary condition for forming a match, we get
the following condition:
y − c ≥ rU(e) (29)
The dowry payment for a groom with educational level e marrying a bride of type y is given
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by:
D(e, y) = β[y − c] + (1− β)[rU(e)] (30)
Hence, three kind of dowry payments are possible at the equilibrium:
D(el, el) = β[el − c] + (1− β)[rU(el)] (31)
D(eh, el) = β[el − c] + (1− β)[rU(eh)] (32)
D(eh, eh) = β[eh − c] + (1− β)[rU(eh)] (33)
Based on these dowry payments we can derive three propositions :
1. Proposition 1 : Men with higher education receive higher dowry than their less educated
counterparts.
2. Proposition 2: Families of brides who are higher educated need to pay higher dowries, as
they can only be matched with higher educated grooms.
3. Proposition 3: Families with low educated single women need to pay less dowry, as they
can be matched with both low and higher educated grooms. However, a higher educated
groom will have to be paid a higher dowry, but this dowry is lower than that received by
the higher educated groom who married a higher educated bride.
The stability conditions of this equilibrium are discussed in Albrecht and Vroman (2002)
under the case for cross-skill matching. Two conditions that would facilitate this equilibrium
based on the equilibrium conditions are as follows : (i) smaller spread between the productivities
of the low educated and high educated women (ii) larger the proportion of eligible men and
women with low education.
8.3 Empirical Evidence
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Educational Attainment 11656 4.49 3.76 0 15
Dowry 11656 107.09 125.92 0 2050
Measure of Eligible Men 9341 32.19 30.46 0 100
Relative caste wealth 9153 33.54 32.64 0 100
Age 11656 13.64 4.91 6 22
Education level of household head 11656 7.25 4.80 0 15
Highest education level of female adult 11656 3.59 4.40 0 15
Land owned (in acres) 11656 0.04 0.08 0 1.9
Roof_type 11656 3.84 2.72 1 10
Brahmin 11656 0.06 0.24 0 1
OBC 11656 0.38 0.49 0 1
ST 11656 0.11 0.31 0 1
SC 11656 0.17 0.38 0 1
Muslim 11656 0.11 0.31 0 1
Number of Persons in household 11656 7.82 3.55 2 33
Preference for Son 11656 0.31 0.46 0 1
No of Male siblings (children) 11656 1.11 1.14 0 10
No of Male siblings (teenage) 11656 0.63 0.83 0 6
No of Male siblings (adults) 11656 0.62 0.95 0 6
No of female siblings (children) 11656 1.00 1.16 0 8
No of female siblings (teenage) 11656 0.17 0.99 0 7
No of female siblings (adults) 11656 0.04 0.37 0 6
District Educational Infrastructure
Number of primary schools 11656 11.24 7.37 0 41
Number of middle schools 11656 9.66 6.51 0 40
Number of secondary schools 11656 3.73 2.42 0 11
Number of senior secondary schools 11656 1.55 1.74 0 8
Number of colleges 11656 0.73 1.09 0 6
Number of Government colleges 11656 0.08 0.28 0 2
Number of Vocational or Technical Institutes 11656 0.04 0.22 0 2
Status of Women in Household
Beat wives if goes out without telling husband 11656 0.45 0.50 0 1
Beat wives if dowry expectation not met 11656 0.28 0.45 0 1
Beat wives if household work is neglected 11656 0.35 0.48 0 1
Beat wives if cooking is bad 11656 0.29 0.46 0 1
Beat wives if suspected of extramarital affair 11656 0.90 0.30 0 1
Women’s name in ownership or rental papers for home 11656 0.13 0.34 0 1
Media Exposure
Women’s exposure to radio 11656 0.57 0.70 0 2
Women’s exposure to newspaper 11656 0.25 0.55 0 2
Women’s exposure to TV 11656 0.90 0.85 0 2
Men’s exposure to radio 11656 0.73 0.73 0 2
Men’s exposure to newspaper 11656 0.58 0.72 0 2
Men’s exposure to TV 11656 0.92 0.79 0 2
Additional variables used in Engel Curve Estimation
Share of educational expenses 20401 0.01 0.03 0 0.8
Number of persons (log) 20401 1.6 0.5 0.00 3.50
Per capita expenses (log) 20401 8.80 0.66 3.87 12.10
Share of age-sex cohort in household
share of males (age 0-5) 20401 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.6
share of males (age 5-10) 20401 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.75
share of males (age 10-13) 20401 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.66
share of males (age 13-16) 20401 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.66
share of males (age 16-18) 20401 0.02 0.06 0.00 1
share of males (age 18-21) 20401 0.21 0.14 0.00 1
share of males (age 21 -55) 20401 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.50
share of females (age 0-5) 20401 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.60
share of females (age 5-10) 20401 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.75
share of females (age 10-13) 20401 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.66
share of females (age 13-16) 20401 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.66
share of females (age 16-18) 20401 0.03 0.89 0.00 1
share of females (age 18-21) 20401 0.21 0.13 0.00 1
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Figure 1: Expected Dowry Payments
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Table 2: OLS Regression Results
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 OLS5
Dowry 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.328*** 0.316*** 0.310*** 0.314*** 0.317***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Education level of household head 0.136*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.124*** 0.107***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Highest education level of female adult 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.176*** 0.173*** 0.140***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Land owned 0.803 0.436 0.680 0.620 0.162
(0.621) (0.597) (0.587) (0.546) (0.550)
Roof type 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.035**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Brahmin -0.120 -0.141 -0.081 -0.089 -0.099
(0.128) (0.124) (0.128) (0.132) (0.134)
OBC -0.575*** -0.533*** -0.498*** -0.470*** -0.368***
(0.094) (0.090) (0.094) (0.094) (0.098)
ST -0.766*** -0.748*** -0.714*** -0.792*** -0.782***
(0.147) (0.143) (0.147) (0.145) (0.152)
SC -0.776*** -0.726*** -0.683*** -0.636*** -0.535***
(0.114) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.112)
Muslim -0.900*** -0.900*** -0.824*** -0.835*** -0.653***
(0.138) (0.135) (0.141) (0.143) (0.147)
Number of household members -0.141*** 0.117*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.103***
(0.011) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Male siblings (children) -0.389*** -0.370*** -0.359*** -0.332***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048)
Male siblings (teen) -0.018 -0.012 -0.006 -0.010
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Male siblings (adults) -0.502*** -0.494*** -0.501*** -0.521***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054)
Female siblings (children) -0.240*** -0.224*** -0.217*** -0.198***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036)
Female siblings (teen) -0.331*** -0.322*** -0.313*** -0.305***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Female siblings (adults) -0.252*** -0.246*** -0.252*** -0.235***
(0.080) (0.082) (0.085) (0.091)
Controls for district educational infrastructure No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for status of women in the household No No No Yes Yes
Controls for media exposure No No No No Yes
Constant -0.374** -1.141*** -0.902*** -0.473** -0.843***
(0.156) (0.167) (0.187) (0.224) (0.229)
R2 0.407 0.425 0.422 0.425 0.442
Observations 14559 14559 14099 12696 11656
Notes : Dependent Variable is Number of Years of Schooling (women)
Robust standard errors clustered at village and household level are reported in parenthesis.
Significant at 90(*), 95(**), and 99(***) percent confidence.
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Table 3: IV 2sls Estimation
FS1 IV1 FS2 IV2 FS3 IV3 FS4 IV4 FS5 IV5
Dowry -0.011* -0.011* -0.013* -0.015** -0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Age -0.102 0.304*** -0.078 0.295*** -0.135 0.293*** -0.268 0.295*** -0.298 0.295***
(0.256) (0.011) (0.249) (0.011) (0.247) (0.011) (0.224) (0.011) (0.254) (0.012)
Education level of household head 2.241*** 0.161*** 2.212*** 0.162*** 2.012*** 0.160*** 2.015*** 0.159*** 0.808 0.124***
(0.520) (0.017) (0.565) (0.018) (0.554) (0.018) (0.534) (0.021) (0.593) (0.018)
Highest education level of female adult 1.949** 0.207*** 1.904** 0.210*** 1.798** 0.208*** 2.033*** 0.209*** 1.497* 0.167***
(0.784) (0.018) (0.753) (0.019) (0.755) (0.020) (0.768) (0.021) (0.826) (0.019)
Land owned 76.772** 1.075 74.509** 0.781 90.898** 1.365 102.430** 1.396 90.665** 0.718
(35.968) (1.00) (36.677) (1.009) (38.782) (1.135) (40.172) (1.256) (40.944) (1.231)
Roof type 6.715*** 0.133*** 6.694*** 0.138*** 6.047*** 0.131*** 5.845*** 0.151*** 4.990*** 0.114**
(0.832) (0.045) (0.832) (0.045) (0.864) (0.044) (0.802) (0.049) (0.853) (0.044)
Brahmin 42.897*** 0.444 43.036*** 0.430 46.496*** 0.617 53.618*** 0.717 56.151*** 0.830
(15.598) (0.396) (15.526) (0.393) (15.315) (0.449) (16.037) (0.524) (15.900) (0.563)
OBC -27.525*** -0.993*** -27.004*** -0.962*** -25.091*** -0.905*** -20.206** -0.882*** -15.314* -0.684***
(9.158) (0.192) (9.068) (0.191) (8.904) (0.191) (8.851) (0.212) (8.731) (0.207)
ST -67.761*** -1.758*** -67.163*** -1.766*** -61.471*** -1.718*** -57.331*** -1.909*** -55.313*** -1.795***
(6.206) (0.465) (6.196) (0.459) (6.359) (0.459) (6.169) (0.504) (6.491) (0.494)
SC -39.824*** -1.422*** -39.026*** -1.380*** -36.124*** -1.332*** -31.426*** -1.357*** -25.236*** -1.127***
(7.540) (0.291) (7.475) (0.285) (7.453) (0.277) (7.221) (0.299) (6.821) (0.275)
Muslim 22.473 -0.868*** 22.983 -0.835*** 27.923 -0.611** 21.823 -0.652** 17.896 -0.465*
(17.352) (0.265) (17.380) (0.272) (17.257) (0.284) (15.292) (0.314) (11.785) (0.282)
Number of household members 0.838 -0.117*** 3.106* 0.149*** 2.712 0.141*** 2.376 0.146*** 2.839 0.161***
(0.690) (0.015) (1.765) (0.038) (1.757) (0.039) (1.852) (0.042) (2.071) (0.046)
Male siblings (children) -2.173 -0.372*** -1.755 -0.357*** -1.066 -0.344*** -1.046 -0.350***
(2.793) (0.061) (2.722) (0.063) (2.780) (0.069) (3.057) (0.075)
Male siblings (teen) -3.461 0.002 -3.216 0.000 -2.370 0.007 -4.724 -0.045
(3.257) (0.075) (3.190) (0.076) (3.333) (0.081) (3.879) (0.086)
Male siblings (adults) -4.316 -0.557*** -3.774 -0.551*** -4.083 -0.572*** -4.345 -0.615***
(3.143) (0.073) (3.198) (0.076) (3.406) (0.081) (3.486) (0.084)
Female siblings (children) -2.290 -0.228*** -1.742 -0.212*** -1.164 -0.199*** -0.825 -0.185***
(2.875) (0.051) (2.802) (0.053) (2.923) (0.060) (3.233) (0.067)
Female siblings (teen) -2.463 -0.349*** -1.963 -0.335*** -2.823 -0.336*** -3.698* -0.347***
(1.877) (0.049) (1.895) (0.050) (1.934) (0.055) (2.152) (0.062)
Female siblings (adults) -2.617 -0.193* -3.744 -0.232** -2.862 -0.196* -3.502 -0.209*
(3.824) (0.108) (3.866) (0.114) (4.149) (0.117) (4.339) (0.125)
Eligible men (IV) -0.767*** -0.767*** -0.691*** -0.679*** -0.664***
(0.233) (0.232) (0.225) (0.231) (0.233)
Caste wealth (IV) 0.521** 0.522** 0.443** 0.495** 0.534**
(0.225) (0.225) (0.222) (0.226) (0.224)
Controls for district educational infrastructure no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for status of women in the household no no no no no no yes yes yes yes
Controls for media exposure no no no no no no no no yes yes
Constant 77.878*** 0.777 69.982*** -0.081 75.422*** 0.272 64.590*** 0.598 59.045*** 0.218
(9.417) (0.48) (10.653) (0.455) (12.496) (0.501) (14.007) (0.511) (14.515) (0.515)
Observations 10903 10903 10903 10903 10903 10903 9837 9837 9028 9028
Notes : Robust standard errors clustered at village and household level are reported in parenthesis.
Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99 (***) percent confidence.
FS1, FS2, FS3, FS4 and FS5 correspond to the first stage regressions.
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Table 4: Robustness check : IV Tobit Estimations
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dowry -0.015* -0.016* -0.018** -0.021** -0.022**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Age 0.319*** 0.309*** 0.307*** 0.308*** 0.308***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Education level of household head 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.169***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024)
Highest education level of female adult 0.251*** 0.254*** 0.250*** 0.254*** 0.205***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026)
Land owned 1.396 1.029 1.771 1.875 1.094
(1.336) (1.327) (1.454) (1.687) (1.687)
Roof_type 0.172*** 0.176*** 0.166*** 0.193*** 0.149**
(0.063) (0.062) (0.058) (0.068) (0.062)
Brahmin 0.591 0.567 0.773 0.946 1.148
(0.540) (0.530) (0.587) (0.712) (0.780)
OBC -1.340*** -1.298*** -1.216*** -1.204*** -0.946***
(0.264) (0.258) (0.249) (0.288) (0.281)
ST -2.425*** -2.425*** -2.327*** -2.622*** -2.499***
(0.658) (0.640) (0.609) (0.702) (0.699)
SC -1.828*** -1.768*** -1.686*** -1.748*** -1.459***
(0.408) (0.392) (0.364) (0.412) (0.382)
Muslim -1.156*** -1.111*** -0.808** -0.847* -0.571
(0.379) (0.382) (0.390) (0.433) (0.382)
Number of household members -0.144*** 0.181*** 0.167*** 0.170*** 0.192***
(0.020) (0.049) (0.050) (0.054) (0.061)
Male siblings (children) -0.461*** -0.437*** -0.416*** -0.426***
(0.080) (0.082) (0.090) (0.099)
Male siblings (teen) -0.016 -0.014 0.001 -0.071
(0.097) (0.098) (0.106) (0.114)
Male siblings (adults) -0.678*** -0.668*** -0.691*** -0.748***
(0.096) (0.099) (0.107) (0.111)
Female siblings (children) -0.319*** -0.294*** -0.267*** -0.249***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.081) (0.090)
Female siblings (teen) -0.349*** -0.330*** -0.339*** -0.358***
(0.064) (0.065) (0.073) (0.084)
Female siblings (adults) -0.224* -0.272* -0.224 -0.244
(0.134) (0.141) (0.148) (0.159)
Controls for district educational infrastructure No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for status of women in the household No No No Yes Yes
Controls for media exposure No No No No Yes
Constant 0.411 -0.611 -0.113 0.369 -0.113
(0.670) (0.621) (0.658) (0.695) (0.710)
N 10903 10903 10903 9837 9028
Notes : Robust standard errors clustered at village and household level are reported in parenthesis.
Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99 (***) percent confidence.
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Table 5: Robustness check : Log Transformation
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
log dowry -2.353*** -2.499*** -2.726*** -2.910*** -2.793***
(0.735) (0.747) (0.808) (0.840) (0.869)
Age 0.303*** 0.295*** 0.292*** 0.298*** 0.295***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Education level of household head 0.201*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.209*** 0.162***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.020)
Highest education level of female adult 0.218*** 0.224*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 0.167***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Land owned 1.712** 1.488** 2.467*** 2.613*** 1.570*
(0.685) (0.696) (0.890) (1.014) (0.902)
Roof_type 0.219*** 0.227*** 0.214*** 0.221*** 0.178***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.047)
Brahmin 0.640** 0.612** 0.879*** 1.033*** 0.963***
(0.265) (0.263) (0.313) (0.352) (0.358)
OBC -1.188*** -1.175*** -1.061*** -0.962*** -0.827***
(0.166) (0.169) (0.157) (0.156) (0.154)
ST -3.793*** -3.921*** -3.867*** -4.124*** -3.875***
(0.887) (0.901) (0.904) (0.932) (0.950)
SC -1.782*** -1.761*** -1.638*** -1.571*** -1.376***
(0.279) (0.282) (0.264) (0.266) (0.256)
Muslim -1.265*** -1.267*** -0.998*** -0.783*** -0.674***
(0.161) (0.166) (0.146) (0.149) (0.150)
Number of household members -0.100*** 0.160*** 0.139*** 0.128*** 0.136***
(0.013) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Male siblings (children) -0.332*** -0.295*** -0.267*** -0.279***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.054) (0.054)
Male siblings (teen) 0.049 0.066 0.107 0.070
(0.057) (0.058) (0.065) (0.064)
Male siblings (adults) -0.608*** -0.600*** -0.555*** -0.606***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.061) (0.062)
Female siblings (children) -0.207*** -0.175*** -0.156*** -0.138***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.046) (0.047)
Female siblings (teen) -0.356*** -0.328*** -0.322*** -0.315***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047)
Female siblings (adults) -0.175 -0.234** -0.175 -0.186
(0.108) (0.108) (0.118) (0.117)
Controls for district educational infrastructure No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for status of women in the household No No No Yes Yes
Controls for media exposure No No No No Yes
Constant 9.223*** 8.838*** 10.094*** 10.101*** 9.486***
(2.876) (2.883) (3.172) (3.057) (3.166)
N 10898 10898 10898 9393 9024
Notes : Robust standard errors clustered at village and household level are reported in parenthesis.
Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99 (***) percent confidence.
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Table 6: Extension1 : Impact of Dowry on Son Preference
(i) (ii) (iii)
Dowry 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Education level of household head -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Highest education level of female adult -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.028***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Land owned -0.781*** -0.846*** -0.503**
(0.172) (0.213) (0.228)
Roof type -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.039***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Brahmin -0.273*** -0.315*** -0.274**
(0.071) (0.103) (0.117)
OBC 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.191***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.036)
ST 0.475*** 0.549*** 0.473***
(0.056) (0.070) (0.095)
SC 0.317*** 0.295*** 0.232***
(0.036) (0.047) (0.059)
Muslim -0.153*** -0.086* -0.117**
(0.050) (0.047) (0.051)
Number of household members -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of children (0-12 age group) 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.076***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.022)
Number of teenage children 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.061***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.018)
Controls for status of women in the household No Yes Yes
Controls for media exposure No No Yes
Constant -0.866*** -0.787*** -0.835***
(0.051) (0.078) (0.070)
Observations 10947 9430 9057
Notes : Dependent variable is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1,
if the stated preference by mother for ideal number of sons is greater than that of daughters.
Robust standard errors, clustered at village level, reported in parenthesis.
IV-2sls estimations
Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99 (***) percent confidence.
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Table 7: Extension 2: Education Expenses Engel Curve Estimation
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
no of persons (log) 0.0076*** 0.0025*** 0.0003 0.0001 0.0008 0.0010
(0.00056) (0.00082) (0.00142) (0.00132) (0.00149) (0.00154)
per capita expense (log) 0.0078*** 0.0044*** -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0010
(0.00060) (0.00069) (0.00188) (0.00173) (0.00200) (0.00196)
share of cohort_m0 -0.0195*** -0.0177*** -0.0165*** -0.0158*** -0.0174*** -0.0189***
(0.00221) (0.00319) (0.00435) (0.00419) (0.00591) (0.00599)
share of cohort_m1 0.0123*** 0.0151*** 0.0153*** 0.0159*** 0.0150*** 0.0129**
(0.00260) (0.00330) (0.00381) (0.00378) (0.00553) (0.00560)
share of cohort_m2 0.0291*** 0.0307*** 0.0295*** 0.0291*** 0.0235*** 0.0212***
(0.00350) (0.00468) (0.00524) (0.00518) (0.00691) (0.00686)
share of cohort_m3 0.0321*** 0.0470*** 0.0454*** 0.0455*** 0.0407*** 0.0377***
(0.00407) (0.00588) (0.00573) (0.00562) (0.00733) (0.00745)
share of cohort_m4 0.0233*** 0.0374*** 0.0378*** 0.0376*** 0.0432*** 0.0418***
(0.00500) (0.00658) (0.00774) (0.00766) (0.00941) (0.00951)
share of cohort_m5 0.0096** 0.0150*** 0.0197*** 0.0204*** 0.0205*** 0.0198**
(0.00402) (0.00544) (0.00656) (0.00650) (0.00790) (0.00819)
share of cohort_m6 -0.0059*** -0.0119*** -0.0085** -0.0081** -0.0158*** -0.0168***
(0.00179) (0.00317) (0.00412) (0.00393) (0.00605) (0.00651)
share of cohort_m7 -0.0086*** -0.0114*** -0.0115*** -0.0110*** -0.0197** -0.0211**
(0.00196) (0.00353) (0.00430) (0.00427) (0.00794) (0.00834)
share of cohort_f0 -0.0187*** -0.0163*** -0.0153*** -0.0145*** -0.0150** -0.0171***
(0.00213) (0.00305) (0.00424) (0.00412) (0.00584) (0.00603)
share of cohort_f1 0.0042* 0.0106*** 0.0113*** 0.0123*** 0.0095* 0.0070
(0.00222) (0.00311) (0.00390) (0.00385) (0.00564) (0.00574)
share of cohort_f2 0.0205*** 0.0251*** 0.0261*** 0.0260*** 0.0199*** 0.0198***
(0.00364) (0.00530) (0.00607) (0.00593) (0.00730) (0.00759)
share of cohort_f3 0.0206*** 0.0295*** 0.0211*** 0.0216*** 0.0177** 0.0153**
(0.00383) (0.00502) (0.00593) (0.00584) (0.00732) (0.00744)
share of cohort_f4 0.0070 0.0082 0.0111 0.0113 0.0114 0.0085
(0.00445) (0.00575) (0.00698) (0.00693) (0.00789) (0.00798)
share of cohort_f5 -0.0001 0.0020 0.0037 0.0043 0.0027 0.0023
(0.00265) (0.00373) (0.00461) (0.00457) (0.00639) (0.00668)
share of cohort_f6 0.0036** -0.0022 -0.0042 -0.0039 -0.0060 -0.0070
(0.00151) (0.00194) (0.00258) (0.00255) (0.00589) (0.00625)
Education level of household head 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0007***
(0.00010) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00014)
Highest education level of female adult 0.0004*** 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
(0.00011) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00016)
land owned 0.6766 -0.0685 -0.0018 -0.3047 -0.4425
(0.71569) (0.84156) (0.83298) (1.14150) (1.14255)
Roof_type 0.0003** -0.0006* -0.0006** -0.0006* -0.0006*
(0.00014) (0.00030) (0.00029) (0.00032) (0.00032)
Brahmin 0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0017 -0.0017
(0.00141) (0.00236) (0.00239) (0.00298) (0.00312)
OBC 0.0018* 0.0043*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0047***
(0.00097) (0.00144) (0.00141) (0.00158) (0.00164)
ST 0.0010 0.0071** 0.0071** 0.0067** 0.0067**
(0.00135) (0.00299) (0.00289) (0.00301) (0.00310)
SC 0.0006 0.0045** 0.0043** 0.0033* 0.0031*
(0.00116) (0.00185) (0.00172) (0.00184) (0.00185)
Muslim 0.0008 0.0010 0.0016 0.0006 0.0011
(0.00166) (0.00196) (0.00194) (0.00161) (0.00166)
Dowry 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001**
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005)
Constant -0.0704*** -0.0419*** -0.0045 -0.0014 0.0066 0.0087
(0.00553) (0.00693) (0.01519) (0.01384) (0.01701) (0.01653)
N 20401 12543 10030 10030 7928 7609
P-value : Cohort 1 comparison 0.001*** 0.154 0.277 0.305 0.170 0.140
P-value : Cohort 2 comparison 0.045** 0.304 0.569 0.597 0.594 0.840
P-value : Cohort 3 comparison 0.023** 0.014** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.006***
P-value : Cohort 4 comparison 0.008*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003***
P-value : Cohort 5 comparison 0.044** 0.036** 0.030 ** 0.027 ** 0.044 ** 0.059*
Notes : Robust standard errors, clustered at village level, reported in parenthesis.
Significant at 90(*), 95(**) and 99 (***) percent confidence.
Cohort 1 : age group 5 to 10 (primary school) ; Cohort 2 : age group 11 to 13 (upper primary);
Cohort 3 : age group 14 to 16 (high school); Cohort 4 : age group 17 to 18 ( secondary school) ; Cohort 5:age group 18 to 21 (university)
Cohort 6 : age group 22-55 ; cohort 7: age group 55 above
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